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DIVERSITIES
AN ILLINOIS DISBARMENT PROCEEDING
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallumr is a reasonably
short and very sad opinion. W. W. McCallum was the defendant
in a proceeding to disbar. There were three serious charges against
him. The first one was a charge that he had conspired with one
Scanlan to maintain an action for personal injury to Scanlan when
there had been no injury of consequence and what there was had
been self inflicted. The testimony to prove the charge was ample
to make a prima facie case. However, the testimony to refute the
charge was strong and the result was that the commissioner was
not convinced that the charge had been proved. The majority
of the Supreme Court of Illinois agreed with the commissioner.
The minority of the court without concurring in that conclusion
and without comment upon it decided to consider the other two
charges. Therefore no further consideration will be given in this
review to the first charge.
The second count in the information against McCallum was
that he had made a false affidavit in order to have the suit which
he had instituted in favor of Scanlan under the name -of Donahue
advanced for an early trial. Scanlan, alias Donahue, had made
an affidavit in form although it was not actually sworn to by him.
However, it was completed as to form by a notary and it was
presented to the trial court as if it were a regular affidavit under
oath by Donahue. In this affidavit Scanlan stated that he had been
informed by his doctor that his back had been broken and that he
was permanently injured for life, paralyzed in fact, and totally
disabled from assisting himself; that at the time of the injury
he had no income or means of support except his daily wages;
that he had a wife and two children totally dependent upon him;
that he was in urgent need of medical care and attention; that he
had no money or friends to secure help for him; that he had exhausted all means in trying to secure help from his friends and
relatives; and that he was then confined to his home in a helpless
condition unable to seek employment to maintain himself.
Scanlan knew these statements to be false. Indeed, Scanlan
had been hired by the railroad company against which the suit
was brought to expose McCallum. Scanlan was playing a game
throughout the proceedings.
McCallum as the attorney for Scanlan, alias Donahue, filed an
affidavit in court in support of his client's affidavit and in this affidavit he stated that he believed that the facts set forth in the Donahue affidavit were true and that he was entitled to an immediate
trial of the law suit. Accordingly he asked that the cause be set
down for trial at any early date.
1. (1930) 341 Ill. 578, 173 N. E. 827.
[4571
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While Scanlan's affidavit stated that he was confined to his
home, he was first at Mercy Hospital, later at St. Luke's Hospital,
and then he was removed to -the Sheridan Plaza Hotel. Later he
was taken to the Parkway Hotel and'finally to the Sherman House
where he remained until the case went to trial. The majority opinion states that: "All of the hospital bills, doctor- bills, -hotel and
other expenses were paid by the McCallums." By, the McCallums
is meant the respondent and his brother who was associated with
him in his practice but who was not a lawyer. The majority also
stated: "There is no evidence showing or tending to show that. at
the time respondent made the affidavit; in question -he did not believe the facts therein stated as to Donahue'& physical and financial
condition." The minority of the court made the following assertions with reference to the statements contained- in W. W. McCallum's affidavit concerning the financial and medical needs of Scanlan:
"They were false and they were known by the respondent as -well as
Donahue to be false. Donahue was not in urgent need of medical care
and attention, he had made no effort to secure help, from his friends
or relatives, and he was not, and had not been, confined to his home. He
was living comfortably, if not luxuriously, in a well appointed hotel,
and funds to meet all his requirements were- advanced -to, him. by the
respondent -and his brother and the funds so advanced were to be refunded with interest at five per cent together.with attorney's: fees, out
of the money to be recovered from the railroad company."
In spite of this factual situation the majority ofthe Supreme
Court of Illinois consisting of Heard, J., who wrote*the, opinion,

Farmer, J., Duncan, J., and Orr, J., held that McCallum should

not be disbarred and on this count they did not- even seem to think
that he should be suspended or that he should even be reprimanded.
How can it be expected that- laymen will have confidencer-in 'the
ethical standards of the bar when a majority of a Supreme- Court
can get themselves into a frame of mind that, entirely condones
such unethical conduct?
What argument was given by the majority- for this lax attitude? It was that while McCallum knew, that the, family of
Scanlan lived in Minnesota yet McCallum also knew, that Scanlan
had been working in Chicago for some time on a presumably
permanent job. However, it was conceded. byi the -majority that
the affidavit of McCallum made a false statement in: asserting that
he (McCallum) believed that Scanlan was confined to his.-home
at that time. This false statement of McCallum's, belief was; excused as a "mere technicality." It was also argued by the majority
that McCallum believed the assertions in Scanlan's caffidavit with
reference to his physical and financial condition -and that "those
facts" if true would have entitled Scanlan to an: early, trial. Accordingly it was concluded that "it was immaterial, whether he was
confined to his home or was confined under like, conditions in, a
room in the Sherman House." In the first place it is not possible
to agree with the majority that McCallum believed all- of Scanlan's affidavit concerning his financial condition. He well knew

DIVERSITIES

that Scanlan was not in urgent need of medical care and attention
and he also knew that Scanlan stated falsely that he had no money
and had exhausted all means in trying to secure help from his
friends and relatives. W. W. McCallum and his brother, James
A. McCallum, were at that very time, and had been, supplying
the living and medical expenses for Scanlan. W. W. McCallum
knew that Scanlan was living in an expensive hotel and no claim is
made that the McCallums were not expecting to continue so to
provide for Scanlan. In the second place the argument of the
majority seems to be that it is ethical for an attorney to have his
client 'lie under oath and then to support it with his own false affidavit as long as the falsehoods in the opinion of the Supreme Court
are immaterial. This seems to mean that the majority assumed to
say thaf the lies were immaterial to the trial court which had to
pass upon the motion to advance the cause. The trial court apparently thought otherwise and fined McCallum for contempt of
court. 2 It is submitted that the attitude of the majority is inde2. The per curiam opinion stated that the trial court censured the attorneys for the railroad company, fined both McCallums $500 each, and
sent Scanlan to jail. The majority state that "the McCallums were each
fined $250." The trial judge was Judge Harry Fisher of Cook County. He
was also the judge who advanced the cause for early trial according to a
statement in a petition for xe-heariig filed by the Chicago Bar Association.
In the same petition there is a quotation from the opinion of the trial
judge. He concluded that both McCallums knew the falsity of the Scanlan,
alias Donahue, affidavit concerning dependency and place of residence.
"There could have been no doubt in the mind of either of them that if the
court knew the real facts as they knew it (sic), the motion would have
been denied." How can this position be doubted?
Mr Justice Thompson in the opinion first delivered for the court, without any dissent being noted, stated: "Whether the court would have advanced the case if the affidavit had stated the fact that he (Scanlan) was
being maintained at a hotel by respondent or by his brother, or by both,
is beside the point. The fact remains that the situation presented to the
court by these affidavits was false.and that respondent knew it."
The second, per curiam, opinion was delivered without dissent and
therein it is stated: "Respondent's affidavit was false. He swore that he
believed the facts set forth by Scanlan's affidavit were true and that he was
entitled to an early trial. Respondent knew that Scanlan was not in urgent
need of medical care and attention; he knew that Scanlan had been furnished
money with which to secure help; he knew that Scanlan was receiving
medical care in hospitals and from physicians who were being paid by
respondent; he knew that Scanlan was receiving money for the support of
his family, which funds were paid by checks signed by respondent; he knew
that Scanlan was not confined to his home in a helpless condition but that
he was living at a hotel and that resp6ndent was paying the bill. Respondent filed this affidavit of his own free will and accord. He was not
tricked into executing it or filing it and was under no obligation to file it.
Regardless of any questionable acts and testimony by any or all other parties
or witnesses to this transaction, respondent was without excuse in filing this
affidavit. By filing it he deceived the court. He presented to the court a
state of facts which did not exist and which he knew did not exist. Upon
such false facts he induced the court to advance the case for trial, which
the court probably would not have done if the true facts had been presented.
It is the duty of every member of the bar to be candid and fair in his
dealings with the court, and it is unethical and unprofessional for him to do
otherwise. In presenting these affidavits respondent did not deal fairly with
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fensible. It entirely overlooks the proposition that falsehood may
be symptomatic of standards generally. Moreover it encourages
"corner cutting" lawyers to ply their trade.8
The closing statement in the majority opinion with reference
to the second count is highly significant. It follows: "The charge
in the second count of the'information is tantamount to a charge of
perjury against respondent and the evidence in the case falls far
short of the degree of proof required to substantiate such charge."
Unfortunately there are precedents which will justify the court in a
general way at least in applying the rules of criminal law to disbarment cases. Nevertheless, that attitude seems to be highly objectionable. The court's statement seems to imply that the more
serious charges are the easiest to defend. If criminal law standards
are to be the standards of conduct for attorneys-at-law, then the
lawyers of the country should cease hypocritically to claim that
their profession is an honorable one. Rules of criminal law in the
main merely attempt to protect society against conduct which is
detrimental to the social welfare. It is hardly to be supposed that
in general such rules represent anything above the minimum standards of conduct and ideals for the whole mass of the people. An
ethical standard which cannot rise above that does not entitle any
organization to be respected. Therefore it is highly desirable for
the courts to abandon completely all talk that a lawyer charged
with a crime or that which is "tantamount" thereto can remain
a lawyer so long as he is not proven to be a criminal. The majority
of the Supreme Court of Illinois has furnished a powerful argulawyers as a class are not worthy of their place in
ment that
4
society.
the court and was guilty of a violation of the ethics of his profession.
People v. Barrios, 237 Ill. 527; People v. Case, 241 id. 279." See question

No. 84 A. B. C. of N. Y.

3. The majority of the Supreme Court also stated that while the respondent and his brother had advanced money to Scanlan for personal expenses and for assistance to the Scanlan family, "yet they were under no
obligation to do so." Even though they were under no obligation (the
terms of the contract between McCallum and Scanlan are not fully stated
and in any event it was voidable, apparently, for fraud) the fact was that
McCallum made advances. So, it is submitted, the minority was correct
in stating that McCallum made a false affidavit when he stated under oath
that he believed that Scanlan had no means of support for himself and
amily than his daily wages; that Scanlan was in urgent need of medical
care; that Scanlan had no money or friends to secure it and had exhausted
all means in trying to secure such help.
4. Cf. People ex rel. v. Macaudey (1907) 230 Ill. 208, 82 N. E.

612, and People ex rel. v. Gilmore (1931) 345 Ill. 28, 177 N. E. 710.
The majority failed to make it clear whether the rules concerning perjury
would apply in a disbarment proceeding, to wit: (1) the two-witness rule;
(2) material falsehood;

(3)

proof beyond a reasonable doubt (assuming

that that means more than proof that
justice).

.convinces

a mind striving to do

In this connection an article in Harper's magazine for June, 1931,

entitled "Perjury Rampant" is interesting reading.
"A lawyer's conduct should conform with ideals which are measured
by higher standards than mere minimum xeguirements. It is not necessary
that law should be violated in order that confidence shall be impaired. A
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The minority took the position that a court is entitled
to perfect candor from attorneys appearing in the court. They
quoted from the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association. Between the two standards announced by the
members of the Supreme Court of Illinois there should be no compromise. The minority of the court is right or else the standards
of the legal profession in the respect considered are odious. This
particular conduct of McCallum warranted his disbarment.
The third count of the information against W. W. McCallum
contained two charges. (a) It was charged that James A. McCallum was his partner in the practice of law and it was an admitted fact that James A. McCallum was not a member of the bar.
(b) It was also charged that W. W. McCallum personally and
through his brother and employees in his office solicited personal
injury suits and maintained, clients thus obtained by advancing
money to them pending the outcome of the litigation.
With reference to (a), it was a matter of record that the third
division of the Appellate Court of Illinois, first district, had criticized 'V. W. McCallum and his brother for practicing law as
partners and had affirmed the ruling of a trial court in Cook County
in refusing to recognize a lien on a cause of action which was
prosecuted by W. W. MacCallum.5 Thereafter the Chicago Bar
Association took notice of the criticism and wrote to W. W. McCallum asking him to consider the opinion of the Appellate Court
as a charge against him. W. W. McCallum answered this letter
by stating that in his opinion there was nothing improper in the relationship. This, perhaps, is significant of his professional standards. However, he also stated that he would see to it that in the
future, ". . . our arrangements are such that they cannot be
man who keeps just within the limits of law and thereby keeps just outside of the criminal classes, whether he be lawyer or not, may excite wonder
at his shrewdness, but inspires no confidence in his integrity, and, in the
case of the lawyer, provokes suspicion against a system which admits him
to its ministry of justice.
"It is not sufficient for the preservation of the essential integrity of the
system that in the exercise of his privileges and in the performance of his
duties the lawyer shall be careful only to avoid punitive discipline under the
criminal laws. Without becoming an actual criminal a lawyer's conduct
may become so intolerabl as to require his disbarment. But, if every lawyer
made this limit alone the measure of his conduct, the profession would merit
scorn, and the administration of justice would be viewed with suspicion.
No system of justice which complaisantly tolerates the abuse of professional
privileges or the violation of professional duty by lawyers, can command
the confidence of the public." Report of committee, N. Y. C. L. A., pp. 5-6.
5. Pids v. Chicago, etc. Co. (1924) 233 Ill. App. 625 (mere memorandum showing that an opinion was delivered; but it was not printed among

the official cases of the court).

In both the opinion by Mr. Justice Thompson and in the per curiam
opinion the conclusion was expressed that V. W. McCallum and his brother
had continued their partnership and "that the brother was thus enabled to
practice law without a license." This was a convenient arrangement. The
brother could safely testify (so far as disbarment is concerned) that he
advanced the money to clients out of his personal funds and that the
respondent had no interest in the advances.
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criticized." Thus the complaint was dropped until the present proceeding was instituted. So the question arose whether there had
been any significant change in the relationship between W. W.
McCallum and his brother. As to that the majority of the Illinois
Supreme Court were not definite. The majority opinion merely
stated: "Without going into the evidence in detail, we are of the
opinion that it shows that since that time, while J. A. McCallum
was connected with the office of respondent, his connection was
that of employee and not of a partner." The conclusion of the
minority of the court was directly to the contrary. They stated
that the evidence clearly established that ".

.

.

no substantial,

practical change was made in the conduct of the business.
"
They also stated that J. A. McCallum shared in the profits of the
business.
(b)
The majority of the court divided the second part of the
third count into two parts: (1) advancing of living expenses and,
(2) the solicitation of claims. They stated:
"In most such cases the clients were unable to work, had no money
or property, and their only asset was the claim for damages against the
railroad, upon which respondent had a lien. We know of no law which
makes it more unethical under such circumstances to advance living and
medical expenses to the client, and so prevent his becoming a public
charge, than it would be, if the client's only asset were a piece of real
estate, to advance him, on a mortgage thereon, money for such expense."
It is necessary to observe with reference to this statement that the
majority of the court confined its remark to "most" of such cases.
A question arises with reference to the other cases. "Most" of
the cases, presumably, need not be over fifty-one percent. Accordingly the majority opinion will have to be interpreted to mean that
W. W. McCallum was not even open to censure for advancing
living expenses in cases where there was no necessity for it.6 The
6. Mr. Justice Thompson in his opinion stated: "Eleven witnesses who
had suffered injuries while in the employ of railroad companies testified
in support of the charges contained in the third count of the information.
Each of these persons was solicited by respondent, his brother or one of
their agents, and, as an inducement to employ respondent, was assured that

all court costs, hospital bills and doctor's fees would be advanced and that

he would be maintained during the pendency of the settlement of the claim.
Each of these persons signed a contract employing respondent on a con-

tingent basis and each of them was maintained by respondent and his brother
as agreed. Two employees of respondent testify that respondent solicited

personal injury cases through his brother and other agents and that it was a
regular practice to maintain these clients until their claims were settled or
their cases tried."
After discussing other testimony favorable and unfavorable it was concluded: ". . . that respondent and his brother employed solicitors, who
visited hospitals and urged injured railroad men to employ respondent to
prosecute their claims on a contingent basis; that as an inducement to
procure his employment respondent authorized his agents to represent to
prospective clients that he would pay all costs of litigation and liberally
maintain them during the pendency of the litigation; that the business of
maintaining clients was a regular system established as a part of the partnership business; that no investigation was made to determine whether a client
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majority seemed to be oblivious to experience with reference to
personal injury litigation. It is believed that the situation in Chicago is not different from that in other cities and that accordingly
securing personal injury litigation is a highly competitive affair.
Advancement of living expenses, even for living, it appears, in expensive hotels, is one of the costs of the business and isone of
the talking points in a trade which is highly commercialized. Are
we to attribute this lack of interest in the realities of the situation
to the fact that the four majority members of the Supreme Court
of Illinois come from rural districts and therefore are not familiar
at first hand with a serious evil of the profession? Two of the
minority are from Chicago and Peoria, the latter a city of over
100,000. But even though the majority might not be familiar with
it by virtue of experience that is no satisfactory excuse for not
becoming acquainted with it as a matter of reading. In this connection the majority of the court cited with approval Johnson v.
Great Northern Railway Co. 7 The author in a recent article discussed the Johnson case in so far as it, gives some approval to
solicitation of personal injury suits by attorneys who act for themwas in actual need of financial assistance, and money was advanced from
time to time without regard to the financial condition of the client, and
that the respondent permitted his brother to use his license to practice law
as a mere background for a profitable commercial business."
The per curiam opinion substantially repeats this last quotation except
the remark about advancing money to clients without regard to the need.
In the per curiam opinion also appears the following conclusion: "Respondent has tried to explain the evidence of the ten or twelve witnesses
who testified that they were solicited by respondent or his agents and were
sustained by him pending their trials

.

.

.

The commissioner who saw

the witnesses and heard them testify found that the respondent was guilty
under the second and third counts. We think his finding is fully sustained
by the evidence."
Mr. Justice Heard for the majority of the court could not understand
the difference between advancing money to a client for "living and medical
expenses" on the security of a cause of action and on the security of real
estate. The objection to such an advancement is that it places the attorney
under the temptation to suborn perjury and do other things that are not
conducive to the administration of justice. If the security is the cause of
action and nothing else the lawyer realizes that a failure to recover will
mean in most instances of personal injury litigation that his loan will never
be repaid. If the security is a piece of real estate it is not believed that
the temptation will be so great. The failure to recover does not mean that
the loan probably will not be repaid. Embarrassment there probably will be
in the latter situation and it would seem better for the lawyer to send his
client elsewhere to borrow on the security of his real estate.
7. (1915) 128 Minn. 365, 151 N. W. 125, L.R. A. (1917B) 1140. It also
cited Potterv. Ajax Mining Co. (1900) 22 Utah 273, 61 Pac. 999, which was
a proceedings to enforce an attorney's lien where there had been a so-called
fraudulent settlement by the client of his claim without the consent of the
attorneys. The contract between the lawyers and the client provided that
the former should "advance the necessary court costs and witness fees."
This provision was held not to be contrary to public policy that would
defeat the lien claim. The understanding was that the advance (merely for
the purpose of entering suit apparently) was a loan. This much seems to
be within the approval of Canon 42 which was not cited since it had not
then been adopted.

26 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

selves. It is one of the stumbling blocks in the way of eradicating
the evil of ambulance chasing from Minnesota where it seems to
thrive like a green bay tree. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, did not hold that it was ethical to advance money to pay a
client's living expenses or hospital bills; it merely held that this
was not against public policy which would result in the denial of
an attorney's lien on a cause of action that had been settled without
the attorney's consent. Most certainly the Minnesota court did
not hold that it would be proper professional conduct to have a
system by which personal injury cases are solicited by offering beforehand to advance money for personal needs or the luxury of
living in expensive hotels as an inducement to making a contract
with the solicitor. Minnesota may in the future hold that that is
ethical conduct; on the other hand it has definitely condemned
solicitation of claims by laymen and by lawyers who act through
laymen."
The majority also cited Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics by which "it is permissible for an attorney to advance
costs and court charges for his client . . . ." It would require
a very liberal interpretation of this canon to justify a construction
that would sanction the advancement of living expenses and hospital bills, particularly when that is done as a systematic procedure
in order to get the business. It reads: "A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or bear the expenses of litigation; he may in good faith advance expenses as a
matter of convenience, but subject to reimbursement." It would
be a matter of surprise to find courts generally interpreting this
canon as justifying one phase of the ambulance chasing evil. It is
not believed that such procedure could fairly be said to be in good
8. (1930) 25 ILLINOIS LAW RMIEW 121, 134. An editorial in the New
York Times for July 20, 1931, entitled "Blackstone Black Sheep" is interesting reading. It comments in part upon a petition filed by the Cleveland
Bar Association asking an investigation of the unethical conduct of a hundred lawyers. One of the complaints is that "certain attorneys . . . pay
living expenses for months while a case is pending because it looks like a
good case and a big settlement."
In the McCallum case, according to the opinion delivered on behalf of
the court by Mr. justice Thompson: "The ledger shows that in the Scanlan
case various sums ranging from $1 to $150, were expended or advanced
from time to time between November 13, 1924, and February 11, 1925. There
is a total of fifty-seven items, aggregating the sum of $1752.19." A similar
utterance appears in the per curiam opinion. When such a sum in such a
short period of time is advanced it is easy to understand the strong temptation to win the suit by fair means or foul. Particularly is that true when
the destinies of the case are guided to a large extent by one who is not
a lawyer, such as James A. McCallum who, according to the commissioner
who heard his testimony, is not "by education, training, or experience
fitted to be a lawyer."
The opinion of Judge Stone of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Winders
v. Illinois Central Railway Co. (1929) 177 Minn. 1, 223 N. W. 291, 226 N. W.
213, shows that he is alive to the realities of the situation.
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faith, or that living expenses or hospital bills are to be included in
the phrase "expenses of litigation."9
(2) With reference to the solicitation of business the majority
of the court admitted that the respondent, W. W. McCallum, had
knowledge of the fact that individuals purporting to represent him
had solicited personal injury cases. The majority also made this
significant statement: "The undisputed evidence in the case is
that it was the general report that all personal injury lawyers in
Chicago had solicitors out." The majority seemed to think that this
factual situation presented a problem with reference to professional
advertising. They made the following statement:
"This court has by way of dictum said that all forms of advertising
are not to be understood as forbidden or to be considered as unethical
or unprofessional; that the canons of ethics of the American Bar Association recognize the publication and circulation, as a matter of convenience, of ordinary business cards stating the attorney's name, location,
his specialty in the law (if he has one not prohibited by law), and
making reference to responsible persons from whom his standing and
responsibility may be learned by persons in need of such an attorney,
or to advertising, to the extent indicated, in any publications that are
circulated among lawyers and business men who may require the
services oA an attorney in a foreign city or state, or even in a local
municipality, provided no improper contract is exacted of the patrons
or the advertisement is unaccompanied by self-laudatory statements
by the attorney or the newspaper editor or proprietor. The dividing
line between advertisements of that character and advertisements by
means of business cards circulated among men who are in urgent need
of an attorney to safeguard their interests, by persons who are paid a
fixed salary, not contingent upon their success in procuring clients, and
where no fraud or misrepresentation is used, is exceedingly narrow.
In each case the money expended by the attorney is for the object of
bringing his name to the attention of persons in need of legal services."
The first sentence, containing over one hundred and fifty words,
in the above quotation is so lengthy and involved that the writer
does not know precisely what the majority was attempting to
assert. It will make for clarity to insert in this place parts of
Canons 27 and 28 which the majority of the court did not directly
mention or quote, and also part of Canon 43, likewise not directly
referred to. Canon 27 provides as follows:

".

.

.

The publica-

tion or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a
9. Question No. 163 of committee of A. B. C. of N. Y. considered
whether a substituted attorney should pay to the former attorney his disbursements. The answer was that such repayment is not professionally
improper provided it be made by the client or out of the recovery by the
succeeding attorney. "In so answering the committee does not approve
the securing of employment by agreement to pay or advance disbursements
for the client."
Question No. 24 presented the problem whether a lawyer could render
charity to his client, or employ him temporarily in his office or advance him
"a little money" to prevent actual physical suffering. The answer in part
was that "the type of charity indicated in the question must inevitably result
in a greater control of the action by the attorney than is consistent with the
free agency of the client who receives that charity and in the creation of
an undue personal interest in the action on the part of the attorney."
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matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews, not warranted by personal relationships, is unprofessional.
.
It is disreputable . . . to
Canon 28 provides: ".
breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to
secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like
purposes or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly, those who
bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office
Canon 43 provides: "The simple professional card mentioned
in Canon 27 may with propriety contain only a statement of his
name (and those of his lawyer associates), profession, address,
telephone number, and special branch of the profession practiced.
The insertion of such card in reputable law lists is not condemned
and it may there give references or name clients for whom the lawyer is counsel, with their permission."
The prolix and involved statement of the majority of the Supreme Court of Illinois apparently means that it is ethical for
lawyers to advertise "to the extent indicated" in publications that
are "circulated among lawyers and business men." This would
seem to authorize*advertising in newspapers and magazines. Then
the court seems to feel a close question between advertisement of
that sort and the circulation of business cards among men in urgent
needs of attorneys, whoever they may be, "by persons who are paid
a fixed salary, not contingent upon their success in procuring clients . . . . ." There are many close questions in the law but
it is not believed that this is one of them. Some doubt may arise
as to the meaning of the word "publication" in the third sentence
of Canon 27. It is possible that it may be interpreted in a technical
sense which would not justify the insertion of business cards in
newspapers and magazines. In that respect it is to be noticed that
the next sentence in Canon 27 in general condemns the "solicitation
of business by circulars or advertisements." The only publication
in the untechnical sense of the word that is obviously approved
is that mentioned in Canon 43 which was not adopted until 1928.
In that canon approval is given for the insertion' of a professional
card in "reputable law lists." However, the committee on professional ethics of the Association of The Bar of The City of New
York has considered the question of advertising and has published
its answers to specific questions which were submitted from January, 1925, to May, 1930. That committee has construed Canon 27
as not forbidding the placing of a professional card in either the
display or classified advertising sections of daily newspapers or in
except possibly where such
legal journals or trade publications,
0
advertising violates a local custom.' Assuming that the courts will
10. The matter of advertising was considered in the following questions submitted to the committee: nos. 31, 48, 53, 63, 67, 74, 76, 83, 101,

131, 135.

The matter of solicitation was considered in the following questions:
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not express standards any more rigorous than those stated by this
committee, it still seems to be true that there is a considerable
difference between such advertising and the hypothetical proposition stated by Mr. Justice Heard for the majority, viz., the circulation of cards among men in urgent need of an attorney by persons
Nos. 7, 16, 43, 53, 60, 78, 89, 93, 97, 103, 126, 127, 134, 138.

Nos. 153 and 155

deal more particularly with stirring up of litigation. There is no clear
dividing line between advertising and solicitation.
In the answer to question No. 48 it was stated that the proposed advertisement in a law journal and newspapers was in violation of a local (New
York) custom even though it seemed not to infringe on canon 27.
The answer to question No. 63 condemned a form letter to be sent

out to the public to call attention to the fact that a law office was especially
equipped to handle claims against carriers.
Classified advertising in a metropolitan newspaper stating that a lawyer
was reliable, experienced, or merely offering free advice was disapproved in
question No. 67 as contrary to canon 27.
Question No. 97 inquired whether a firm or a member of a firm properly riight place a sign containing the firm's name or the name of a member
thereof in the window of a store used as a real estate office. The answer
was in the negative. Upon the hypothesis of such an answer it was further
queried whether it would make "any difference if we had our own employee
in the real estate office to handle all clients who would come into such
office, for an attorney." This was disapproved "as it too readily lends itself
to the improper solicitation of employment for the lawyer."
In the answer to questior; No. 101 the insertion of a lawyer's "card"
in "programs" was disapproved as undignified.
The answer to question No. 131 condemned the following advertisement
in the classified column of a daily newspaper:
"Corporations formed Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Maryland,
$90, including supplies. Name and address."
The committee on professional ethics of the New York County Lawyers'
Association, has published in bound form the questions and answers. prior
to January, 1929, Nos. 1 to 269 inclusive. On pages 10 to 12 inclusive is a
summary concerning advertising and solicitation. With reference to the
latter it is stated in part: "Lawyers should answer a demand, not create
one. They should be in position to scrutinize, correct, and soundly advise.
In a race for business, judgment is too likely to be overridden by anxiety.
It is against the public interest that lawyers should become clamorous and
systematic seekers, by solicitation, for professional employment from those
not qualified to judge of their merits."
The problem of advertising was considered by that committee in questions Nos. 1, 3, 32, 45, 47-I-b, 47-VIII-a, b, d, 47-IX-a, b, 50, 58, 62, 65, 72,
83, 89, 96, 105, 114, 115, 131, 174, 178, 195, 203, 212, 222, 223, 225, 231, 237,
239, 248, 264, 266, 280, 284, 285, 288.
The matter of solicitation was considered in questions Nos. 4, 8, 14, 16,
46, 47-I-a, b, 47-III-a, c, 47-V-a, b, c, 47-VI-a, b, c, d, 47-VIII-c, 69, 74, 81,
91, 109, 117, 122, 126, 140, 150, 172,-177, 198, 199, 219, 224, 227, 228, 244, 256,
268, 278, 293.
Opinion No. 24 of the committee on professional ethics and grievances

of the American Bar Association states a strict interpretation of Canons
27 and 43 with reference to advertising. Part of it follows:
"Prior to the adoption of the canon [27], it was a long standing custom
in certain smaller communities for lawyers to publish their cards in local
newspapers and that is the particular 'local custom'-and the only onewhich it was intended the canon should sanction. As this sanction is an
exception to a well established principle the committee does not believe it
should be extended to other publications or other customs."
See also opinions by the same committee Nos. 9, 11, 13.
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receiving fixed salaries, etc. Such conduct seems to violate Canon
28 in that it constitutes the employment of runners for the purpose
of "seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those
having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as
clients . . . ." The insertion of a business card in a newspaper is a cold and distant affair when compared to a runner handing out to persons in urgent need of an attorney the business
cards of such an attorney. Handing out cards under such circumstances would naturally lead to converation as to the purpose of
handing out the card and there is no occasion to be deceived as to
what the runner would say in most instances in such a conversation.
There is justification in drawing a dividing line where on one
side of the line the conduct would naturally lead to direct and personal solicitation. Above all, however, it should be remembered
that there is no claim that the evidence in this case was that W.
W. McCallum sanctioned merely the circulation of business cards
under the assumed conditions. The majority of the court had
already admitted that he had knowledge of the solicitation of
claims by those who purported to represent him. Accordingly,
the hypothetical discussion concerns a mere strawman.
It is regrettable that the majority of the Supreme Court gives
the appearance of being at variance with the ethics of the profession with reference to advertising. This is stated with full
knowledge that previously the majority of the court had stated that
the canons were a safe guide for professional conduct and that an
attorney "may be disciplined by this court for not observing
them." It is submitted that the utterance of the majority of the
Supreme Court of Illinois in respect to soliciting business and advertising is erroneous or else is so obscure that it has no value
as a desirable precedent.
Finally, however, the majority of the court stated that the
respondent's offense "cannot lightly be passed over." Yet it then
proceeded to pass it over with the lightest penalty known to disciplinary proceedings, i. e., a censure. Once the censure deserved
was spoken of as a "severe" censure. There was an additional
statement "that persistency therein would justify a disbarment."
This warning is calculated to excite the risibilities of individuals
in view of the showing that had been made and in view of the
court's apparent acceptance of the proposition that all personal injury lawyers in Chicago had their solicitors out. Under the circumstances the censure was only a gentle slap upon the wrist.
The minority of the court (Dunn, C. J., De Young, J., and
Stone, J.) considered the question of solicitation of business in
connection with the charge that W. W. McCallum and James McCallum were partners. A9 heretofore stated, the three dissenting
judges thought that the testimony clearly established that there was
a partnership; also that James McCallum solicited and secured
cases; that he directed to a greater extent than the respondent how
they should be conducted and furnished money to indigent clients;
and that he shared in the profits of the partnership. Accordingly

DIVERSITIES

they thought that the respondent should have been disbarred upon
the basis that the third count had been proved.
The entire opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court on
the second and third counts seems to be extremely unfortunate.
What is the explanation of it? In the first place, it is doubtful
whether the majority of the court, being from rural districts, appreciate as fully as they might how serious the evil of ambulance
chasing has become. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate
that the majority were familiar with the long list of cases decided by appellate divisions of the Supreme Court in New York
within recent years." It is significant that the majority of the court
cited the Johmson case and ignored cases from Tennessee and Wisconsin which announce a really ethical point of view.
The first decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Illinois
was handed down in the June term, 1928.12 Mr. justice Thompson
delivered the opinion of the court and there does not appear to have
been any dissent. The court at that time ordered the disbarment of
W. W. McCallum and found him guilty on the second and third
counts of the information. A petition for rehearing was granted.
Thereafter at the April term, 1930, the Supreme Court delivered a
second opinion which was a per curiam opinion."1 The court again
arrived at the same result. i. e., disbarment on both the second
and third counts of the information. The attorneys for the respondent then filed three motions including a motion for permission
to file another petition for rehearing. These motions were denied
on June 16, 1930. On the same day, however, and as part of the
foregoing order the Supreme Court entered an order granting a
rehearing on the court's !'own motion" without comment of any
kind. At the October term, 1930, the present majority opinion was
filed. In the first two opinions it was stated on behalf of the
court that careful consideration had been given to the record.' 4
Why then the change of attitude?"r Is it any wonder that the final
11. Many of them are cited and to some extent they are commented
upon in a recent article in (1930) 25 ILLiNois LAw REviEw 121, 129, n. 15.
12. The opinion seems to have been prepared in February, 1928. The
statements concerning its rendition and other proceedings are based on information given at the request of the author by Mr. John L. Fogle, attorney for the Chicago Bar Association, and upon a letter from the clerk

of the Supreme Court to C. P. Denning of the Chicago Bar Association.
13.

This opinion seems to have been prepared in October, 1928.

14. Mr. Justice Thompson in the opinion first rendered stated:

"We

have read with care the 650 page abstract of the evidence, together with
the briefs of the parties, and have reached the conclusion that the finding

of facts by the commissioner is supported by the record."
The per curiam opinion states:

"We have read the extensive record

in this case with great care and have given careful consideration to all of
the evidence and to every contention made by the respective parties."

15. Mr. Justice Thompson ceased to be a member of the court by the
December term, 1928. See 332 Ill. Hon. Warren H. Orr became a member
of the court by virtue of the judicial election on June 2, 1930. See 340 Ill.

The writer is informed that Mr. Orr filed his oath of office on June 12, 1930.
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action of the Supreme Court of Illinois created a feeling of despair
among some of the leaders of the Chicago Bar Association?16
There is appended what is thought to be a complete list of
Illinois disbarment cases. 17 On the whole the record of the Supreme Court seems reasonably commendable; but it must be remembered, as is demonstrated by the McCallum case, that the final
opinion of the Supreme Court is the only one published so as to be
generally available. The court's reversal of itself in that case also
demonstrates that if one could compare each opinion with the record
he might be able to question the validity of some. For instance,
the decision in the Bither case' seemed unsound to the writer but
the facts were very complicated and time has not been found in
order to revie* it
KENNETH C. SEARS.

ILLINOIS DISBARMENT CASES
I.

WHERE DEFENDANT WAS DISBARRED

1. People ex rel. Cutter v. Ford (1870) 54 Ill. 520, securing fees on
false representation that suit was necessary, and never bringing suit.
16. Fortunately, however, the much abused Chicago Bar Association
does not yet propose to cease its activities for a bar of the proper standards.
Observe the following from a letter to the members from its president:
"A few months ago we had to record a defeat in an individual disbarment case which has attracted a great deal of attenftion. But we have
the satisfaction of having presented the view of the bar as strongly as we
knew how, and we cannot be held to blame for the final discouraging
result, after two rehearings in the Supreme Court. Our able and faithful
grievance committee has not allowed itself to be deterred by this set-back,
but has gone ahead in the pursuit of its double task of protecting good
lawyers from unjust accusation, and purging the bar of unworthy members.
The public, when it calls on us to act, never realizes the cost
in time, effort, and money. The Sanitary District investigation was a duty
that we would have assumed in any event (we all hope), but in fact we had
no choice; yet this investigation, with its necessary consequences, will cost
the Association fully twenty-five thousand dollars. The public demands, with
good reason, that we fight ambulance-chasing, but few know that a single
prosecution of this kind cost the Association nearly ten thousand dollars.
The individual lawyer expects to be protected from the competition of the
quack, and this likewise is in the public interest, but hearings before our
committees (with a court reporter in attendance), and proceedings in court,
run into money very fast. The public pays no part of this. I believe it is
not generally known outside the profession, but all lawyers know, that
when, after an exhaustive investigation (in the interest of fairness), we
file an information in the Supreme Court for the disbarment of a lawyer,
and the court refers the matter to a commissioner for hearing, The Chicago Bar Association pays the whole cost of the prosecution, including the
compensation of its attorney, the charges of the court reporter, and the
printing bills-all without reimbursement. The commissioner contributes his
services, so that it costs the public nothing to be relieved of a dishonest
lawyer."
17. The work in compiling this list of cases was largely that of Mr.
Irving Isenstein of the Chicago Bar.
18. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Bither (1929) 334 Il. 264,
165 N. E. 798.

